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Introduction 
 
In terms of the US and the Caucasus in 2008, there were three important milestones:  
 
(1) the August war in Georgia, which not only resulted in the Russian recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and dealt a fatal blow to Georgian aspirations for 
NATO membership, but which also virtually remade the “geopolitical map” of the 
South Caucasus region; 
 
(2) the September visit to Armenia of Turkish President Abdullah Gul, representing 
a first-ever, historic visit of a Turkish head of sate to Armenia and marking the be-
ginning of the public aspect of Armenian-Turkish “football diplomacy,” seeking to 
“normalize relations between the two countries; 
 
(3) the November election of US President Barack Obama, a significant turning 
point in US politics and foreign policy and promising a “course correction” after the 
eight-year leadership of the Bush Administration. 
 
But it also necessary to include developments in 2009 as well, in order to both properly 
assess the US and the Caucasus and to project shifts in US policy into 2010.  Most impor-
tantly for the US and the Caucasus, there is a new promise of opportunity from the new 
Obama Administration, offering a fresh sense of change and more responsible, multilateral 
global leadership, encompassing an adjustment to US policy regarding Russia, a pursuit of 
a dialogue with Iran and a renewed engagement of Turkey.   
 
The Absence of a New US Policy for the South Caucasus 
 
At the same time, however, there is a serious divide between the promise and potential of 
a new US policy and the reality of the current regional situation.  More specifically, there is 
not yet a new US policy for the South Caucasus, with the region generally viewed as a 
secondary consideration and distant priority.   
 
This lack of any implementation or even broader reformulation of US policy toward the 
Caucasus stems from three key reasons.  First, the US remains distracted and consumed 
by “other priorities,” mainly rooted in dealing with the domestic economic downturn in the 
United States and the aftermath of the global financial crisis.  Second, there is a serious 
delay in putting new Democratic officials in place, with key positions within the US De-
partment of State, National Security Council and Pentagon that normally deal with the re-
gion on a daily basis un-appointed or un-confirmed.   
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And third, the US continues to be distracted from the region by other concerns, including 
an attempt to “reset” or redefine US-Russian relations, an effort to manage its two main 
foreign policy priorities of stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, and a response to new devel-
opments in other areas, such as Moldova, Ukraine, and Central Asia. 
 
Three Dynamic Trends 
 
In light of the absence of any modification to US policy toward the South Caucasus, allow 
me to assess three dynamic trends now underway throughout the region, each of which is 
now influencing the interests and activities of the United States, at times as both a pro-
active and reactive player in the region.  For US interests, these three trends pose an often 
contradictory impact, whereby US engagement in the South Caucasus is largely defined 
by a regional approach that is viewed as a piece of the larger “geopolitical puzzle,” but, at 
the same time, is simultaneously pursued on a country-specific basis, with the three coun-
tries of the region each posing a different set of objectives and challenges for US interests.   
 
From a broader view, however, it would also be fair to add that the US approach to the 
South Caucasus region is also driven by a decision to no longer “unnecessarily provoke” 
Russia or to disregard Russian interests and influence.  These three dynamic regional 
trends include: 
 
Trend One: Armenian-Turkish Engagement 
 
The most significant regional trend impacting US policy is the process of Armenian-Turkish 
engagement, in terms of “football diplomacy” and a delicate diplomatic effort to “normalize” 
relations between Armenia and Turkey that would encompass the establishment of normal 
diplomatic relations, Turkey’s opening of its long-closed border with Armenia and the for-
mation of a special “inter-governmental commission,” empowered to resolved a wide range 
of outstanding bilateral issues.  
  
For the US, there has a been a renewed effort of engagement in this process, reflecting a 
degree of “catch-up,” in the wake of an initial Russian diplomatic victory in encouraging 
and even facilitating the Turkish-Armenian initiative.  Moreover, this policy of “catch-up” 
has also been driven by US unease and concern over Turkey new “Stability Platform” for 
the region, as Turkish leaders neither informed nor consulted US officials in advance.   
 
Second, the US has also exerted efforts more covertly, adopting a more active role in the 
“secret” diplomatic meetings between Turkish and Armenian officials in Switzerland, and 
culminating in US assistance, and pressure, in forging a trilateral declaration issued on 
22/23 April 2009 by the Armenian, Turkish and Swiss Foreign Ministries hailing the diplo-
matic process and pointing to the preliminary agreement over a new “roadmap” for normal-
izing relations between Armenia and Turkey.   
 
The trilateral statement declared that “Turkey and Armenia, together with Switzerland as 
mediator, have been working intensively with a view to normalizing their bilateral relations 
and developing them in a spirit of good-neighborliness, and mutual respect, and thus to 
promoting peace, security and stability in the whole region.”  The statement went on to 
note that “the two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in 
this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of 
their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road-map has 
been identified.”   
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Concluding by stating that “this agreed basis provides a positive prospect for the on-going 
process,” the joint statement represents one of the most serious strategic blunders by the 
Armenian government to date.  Although this brief 95-word statement may accurately re-
flect an opportunity for a genuinely historic breakthrough in relations between Armenia and 
Turkey, the message of its text and the timing of its release raised important concerns.   
 
The declaration, issued only days before the traditional Armenian Genocide commemora-
tion of 24 April, led to the perception that Armenia seemingly endorsed Turkish attempts to 
pressure US President Barack Obama from fulfilling his campaign promises to recognize 
the Armenian genocide in his traditional April 24th statement.  The statement was also 
largely perceived as an effort to pressure all sides to move forward with the possible nor-
malization agreement and to exert leverage to maintaining the momentum of the process.   
 
This US leverage was also designed to exploit the “asymmetry of power” between not only 
Turkey and Armenia, but also between Armenia and the West in general.  In addition, 
there also seems to be an effort by the United States to exert pressure on the parties to 
achieve or at least demonstrate some degree of parallel progress over the Nagorno Kara-
bagh conflict, as the sole “frozen conflict” in the region.  This effort to add the Karabagh 
issue to an already complicated process, however, may only inject an insurmountable and 
unnecessary obstacle into the Armenian-Turkish process. 
  
Trend Two: Broader Geo-Strategic Interests 
 
Clearly, the US is now driven by a set of broader geo-strategic interests tied to its two main 
policy priorities: stabilizing and securing both Iraq and Afghanistan.  Based on these 
needs, US policy has elevated several new concerns for each theater.  For Iraq, the need 
to re-engage Turkey and rebuild US-Turkish military-security relations, while reassuring 
Ankara over the emergence of a Kurdish “proto-state” in northern Iraq, is a priority for both 
Turkish support in Iraqi stability and in order to assist US plans for an eventual military 
withdrawal from Iraq.  In addition, the Obama Administration’s outreach to Iran can also be 
seen as an integral factor in solving the security and stability dilemma of Iraq.  
 
For Afghanistan, the US faces a different set of challenges, defined more by military bas-
ing and logistical requirements, ranging from the need for airspace and territorial access 
through Central Asia and the Caspian “air corridor,” each of which necessitates bilateral 
agreements with several individual Central States, such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, etc., as well as active cooperation and consent from Azerbaijan.   
 
In this way, Russian cooperation is also essential in terms of facilitating US operational re-
quirements for the Afghan theater.  And in the wake of problems with Kyrgyzstan over the 
use of the Manas airbase, Azerbaijan has acquired an even greater degree of strategic 
significance for US military planning, which has thereby only enhanced Azerbaijan’s stand-
ing in US policy toward the South Caucasus.  
    
Trend Three: Engaging Iran 
 
The third dynamic trend driving US policy in the South Caucasus relates to the Obama 
Administration’s effort to engage Iran and craft a new approach stressing a dialogue with 
Iran, to not only resolve outstanding issues, such as the main obstacle of Iran’s burgeon-
ing nuclear program, but to also forge a common approach to regional security, based on 
shared interests. 
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Although the US effort seems to reflect a concerted policy decision to engage Iran by 
stressing common interests, the process has yet to fully start, suggesting some delay until 
after Iran’s presidential elections set for June 2009.  Most practically, the effort may also 
be bolstered by the capacity for the US to exploit two key factors: Iran’s exclusion from 
Turkey’s “Stability Platform” agenda for the region, and Iran’s profound sense of mistrust 
and frustration with Russia. 
 
The Outlook for 2009-1010 & Shortcomings of US Policy 
 
As each of these three trends exert some form of influence on US policy, the outlook for 
the US in the South Caucasus will remain defined by the outcomes of each trend.  But at 
the same time, there are five rather serious shortcomings to US policy toward the region: 
 
1. too little follow-through to US policy, as American interests seem to lack sufficient 
institutionalization, compounded by the slow pace of appointments and confirmations of 
key decision-making officials.  Most notably, even the April 209 visits to Turkey by both 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and President Obama need to be followed up by more 
concrete and specific policies, ranging from the issue of Kurdish separatism and terrorism 
within Turkey proper (demonstrated by the threat from the PKK), to the pressing challenge 
of allaying Turkey’s valid concerns over the situation in Iraq;     
 
2.  far too little focus on domestic political deficiencies and shortcomings within the 
three states of the region, exacerbating a perception of double standards on democracy 
for the sake of short-term energy or security objectives; 
 
3.  no clear consensus of decision of what to do with Georgia in the wake of the Au-
gust war, either in terms of Georgia’s NATO aspirations or its increasingly fragile domestic 
political situation.  Moreover, now that Georgia is no longer the “center of gravity” for the 
West, the US needs to either craft a new mechanism to deal with its interests over Georgia 
or to find a new “center of gravity” in the region, which does not unnecessarily provoke or 
threaten Russia’s positions and interests in the region;    
 
4.  too early to predict but almost too late to implement a real policy shift toward the 
region, fostering frustration in the region amid already high expectations for a sudden and 
complete course correction of US policy after general disdain and disappointment with the 
eight-year Bush record.  In this way, many are now looking to the European Union and its 
new “Eastern Partnership” for offering a fresh promise of change and opportunity; 
 
5.  an outdated regional energy strategy based more on old realities and reflecting 
less of current conditions and needs, only enhancing the lack of consensus on regional 
energy security and posing new challenges to ongoing efforts, such as the Nabucco gas 
pipeline project.   
 
 
 
